A. Introduction
From its inception in 1970 through the early 1990s, the segment of the venturecapital industry that financed minority business enterprises (MBEs) relied upon government sponsors for funding and direction. Nearly all of the minority-oriented venture-capital funds were chartered by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and operated within its regulatory framework. Over the past decade, the minority venture-capital industry has transformed itself, largely shedding its reliance upon SBA funding while adopting the organizational framework -the partnership -of the mainstream venture industry. Why did this transformation take place and what were its consequences?
This study utilizes detailed survey information describing minority venture-capital funds to illuminate the causes and consequences of its transformation. As the industry has moved away from reliance upon the SBA, average fund size and the aggregate industry capitalization have both increased dramatically. A dynamic, profitable minority venture-capital industry emerged by year-end 2000; after-tax net income for the collective SBA-chartered industry in 1993, in contrast, was negative (Bates, 1997) .
Funding provided to MBEs has soared in recent years.
Our analysis compares the performance of SBA-chartered minority venturecapital funds to those beginning operations in the 1990s that chose not to be SBA chartered. We find that the latter group was heavily shaped by the public sector. We do not seek to promulgate the advantages of unfettered free enterprise over the burdens of public-sector partnership. Our findings, instead, point out how differing public-sector strategies have served to impact the minority-business development mandate of the minority venture-capital industry. We conclude by recommending that the SBA model, and its close relatives throughout the public sector, be altered (or abandoned) in favor of far-sighted government policies that reward venture-capital funds for financing viable small businesses.
B. The MESBIC/SSBIC Industry
The birth of the minority-oriented venture-capital industry traces back to President Nixon's first urban initiative, Project Enterprise, which was launched by executive order (Hansley, 1992, p. 2; cited in Bates, 1997) . In practice, patient capital was extended largely to black and Hispanic-owned firms as well as a few nonminority-owned businesses that operated in urban minority communities.
Private capital invested in MESBICs was leveraged by SBA funds, and MESBICs actively making equity (venture capital) investments in MBEs were favored over debt providers when the SBA provided matching funds. In theory, the MESBICs and the SBA were partners pursing the common objective of financing MBEs. In practice, the SBA was a regulator -not a partner -and the contents of its regulations were moving targets, keeping MESBICs guessing as to what their operating parameters were at any point in time (Bates, 2000) .
Pioneering studies of state venture-capital programs, undertaken by Peter Eisinger in the 1980s, noted a profound deficiency in their political viability. At first glance, these programs pursued the same objectives as a variety of government interventions into the private sector: the state venture-capital programs sought to stimulate business formation, job creation, and tax-base expansion. Yet, there was a major difference. Venture-capital investment is the ultimate form of patient capital, with returns -if they are forthcomingoften not realized until seven or more years after the initial investment. "By contrast," notes Eisinger, "the political culture of states stresses short-term achievements, useful as ammunition in the electoral cycle" (1993, p. 137) . Venture-capital programs often lacked a strong political constituency. Priorities changed; budget crises came and went; venturecapital programs withered in this political environment. Regarding reasons for defunding state venture-capital (VC) programs, "claims of effectiveness or lack thereof did not figure in the actual decisions to terminate…" (Eisinger, 1993, p. 135) .
The MESBIC program, like the state VC programs analyzed by Eisinger, repeatedly felt the impact of shifting political priorities. SBA funding policies that promoted venture-capital investments during the 1970s had evolved, by the 1980s, into funding practices that undermined MESBIC venture-capital investments (Bates, 1996) . (Bates, 2000) .
An entirely different type of government institution -the pension fundsurpassed the SBA as the nation's predominant funding source for the minority-oriented venture-capital (VC) industry during the 1990s (Bates and Bradford, 2003 Education, 1989; cited in Eisinger, 1991) . The boldest of this subset were on the threshold of revolutionizing the minority-oriented venture-capital industry. In 1992, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS) invested $25 million each into two minority-focused VC funds --Fairview Capital in
Connecticut and Bastion Capital of Los Angeles (Hellman, 1999) . For the first time, minority-oriented VCs were being viewed as competitive investment opportunities by a public pension fund.
Public pension funds were initially prodded to make in-state investments in venture capital (as well as residential mortgages) by public officials and constituent groups (Rosentraub and Shroitman, 2004) . Most were initially uneasy with the concept, feeling that political pressure to fund an in-state economic development agenda might conflict with their fiduciary responsibilities to retirees (Eisinger, 1991) . The priorities of pension fund managers are clear and invariant: they seek attractive monetary returns when they invest funds in venture capital. Resistance dropped only after some of the pioneer public pension funds realized attractive returns on their venture-capital investments. The minority-oriented venture-capital funds have gained credibility with pension funds by providing such returns (Bates and Bradford, 2003) .
Investments from public pension funds are attractive to the minority-oriented venture-capital industry, in comparison to SBA funding, for several reasons. First, the problem of ever-shifting political priorities -manifested as inconsistent SBA regulations and policies -has not plagued pension funds. To please the public pension funds, the minority-oriented VC funds are required to deliver attractive financial returns. typically, those loans carried interest rates close to the borrowing costs of the U.S.
Treasury (Bates, 1996) . Private investment dollars leveraged by the SBA (sources of funds) were then used to make equity and long-term debt investments in MBEs (uses of funds).
Among the 10 surveyed SBA chartered funds analyzed in this section, note that only six utilized SBA funding (table one) . MESBICs not selling stock to or borrowing from the SBA were most often divisions of commercial banks. Traditionally, banks were not allowed to make equity investments in businesses unless they did so via a SBAchartered small business investment company such as a MESBIC.
Venture-capital funds not chartered by the SBA are commonly set up as partnerships. The general partners are the ones who establish these funds, raise capital from investors, and utilize that capital to make equity investments in firms such as MBEs.
The limited partners are the institutional investors -pension funds, insurance companies, and banks -that provide the bulk of the capital that is used to make the venture-capital investments. If those investments turn out to be profitable, the general partners and the limited partners split them. A common arrangement is for the limited partners to retain 80 percent of the profits, while the general partners collect 20 percent, plus a small fee for managing the venture-capital fund. Among the 14 minority-oriented partnership VC funds analyzed in this section, well over half of their aggregate investment capital was raised from public pension funds.
Sources of funds
Beyond public pension funds and the SBA, where do the minority-oriented VCs raise financial capital? Note (table one) that seven VC funds raised capital from an institutional source known as a "fund of funds". Public pension funds often seek to diversify the risks of their investments in minority VC funds by providing capital to a fund of funds. This intermediary is selected because of its knowledge of the VC industry, and it uses its public pension fund dollars to invest in minority-oriented VC funds. Thus, a public pension fund might invest $100 million directly in a minority VC fund.
Alternatively, the pension fund may choose to invest in the minority-oriented VC sector by investing $100 million in a fund of funds, which, in turn, invests $25 million each in four different minority-oriented VC funds. Investing directly or via a fund of funds, the public pension funds invested more capital into the 14 partnership minority-oriented VC funds than all other sources combined (table one) .
[ Table one about here]
When we undertook this study, we expected to find that the minority-oriented VC funds holding SBA charters were capitalized primarily with government funds.
Partnerships, we thought, would draw their funding primarily from private-sector institutional investors. Our findings indicated otherwise. Among the 24 funds surveyed for this study, the 14 partnership VC funds attracted the majority of their capital from public pension funds, while the ten with SBA charters raised less than 30 percent of their capital from government sources (table one) .
An earlier survey of its membership was conducted in 1999 by the NAIC to determine the sources and dollar amounts of initial capitalization that had launched its members' funds. Reflecting all fund startup capitalization raised since the inception of MESBICs in 1970, 34 responding funds reported capitalization of $1,242.0 million raised from ten sources (table two). As of yearend 1998, over 50 percent of this industry capitalization ($629.9 million) had been contributed by public pension fund direct investments in minority-oriented VC funds. SBA funding -traditionally dominantaccounted for roughly five percent of the industry's capitalization (table two) . Banks, insurance companies, and corporate pension funds --in addition to public pension funds --were more important suppliers of capital, for the minority-oriented VC industry, than SBA funding.
[ Table two about here]
The VC funds that we surveyed in 2001 pursued widely differing strategies in their search for capitalization. Among the ten SBA-chartered funds, none had received pension fund money, either directly or through a fund of funds intermediary. Banks and insurance companies provided nearly half of their aggregate capital; the SBA and private corporations provided most of the rest (table one) . Among the partnership VC funds, in contrast, capital was raised from a broader array of private and public funding sources (table one) : four of these 14 funds tapped five or more sources each. Based upon the survey responses, a partnership VC fund seeking to raise capital from institutional investors would be well advised to approach four types: 1) public pension funds, 2) banks, insurance companies, 3) fund of funds, and 4) corporate pension funds. Note that bank funding of minority-oriented VC is shaped by public policy considerations: the investments made by banks typically qualify for Community Reinvestment Act credit.
Uses of funds
Stark differences in overall fund size and individual investment size typify VC funds chartered by the SBA, versus those set up as partnerships. The average partnership minority-oriented VC fund had over six times the capitalization of the VCs chartered by the SBA --$11.9 million versus $80.6 million (table three) . Thus, the shift in the minority-oriented VC industry from its SBA origins to its present-day public pension fund-supported partnership form has coincided with an increase in capital resources. The average venture-capital investment in MBEs undertaken by the partnership VC funds, furthermore, was nearly four times larger ($1,504,000) than the SBA fund average ($390,900) -see table three.
[ Table three about here]
We collected detailed cash outflow and inflow information on each of the small business investments made by the 24 surveyed minority-oriented VC funds. We used this information to calculate financial returns on investments made during the [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] period that had been realized by yearend 2000. Thus, the investments included in our financial return calculations were at least five years old by yearend 2000 (Bates and Bradford, 2003) .
Eleven of the surveyed minority-oriented funds made realized venture-capital investments that were at least five years old by yearend 2000, and a total of 118 small businesses received these investments. Multiple investments by a fund in one firm were treated as one investment. For the 118 investments, we report in table three the average amount invested, amount realized, and net cash yield for the VC investments made by SBA-chartered and partnership funds. All of the investments described in table three had been "harvested" (sold or otherwise liquidated).
For the SBA-chartered funds, the average investment made in MBEs was for $390,900, and this investment at maturity yielded $1,290,100, generating a net yield of $899,200. Among the partnership VC funds, in contrast, the amount invested in the average deal was $1,504,000, and this investment yielded a gross payoff of $4,503,300
when it was realized; the average net yield, therefore, was $2,999,300 (table three) . Note, however, that the variances attached to these mean dollar amounts were large.
The minority-oriented VCs invest hundreds of thousands of dollars into the average MBE venture-capital recipient, and these investments are often held for seven or more years before they are realized. In many cases the initial outlay never is recouped.
The payback of a VC investment -defined simply as the amount that an investment returns when it is realized minus the amount initially invested -was calculated for each of the 118 investments under consideration. A one million dollar investment that returns $100,000 when it is realized, for example, has produced a payback of minus $900,000.
Among the partnership VCs ( In the venture-capital industry, the standard benchmark for profitability is the internal rate of return (IRR). We have calculated IRRs for each of the 118 venturecapital investments, where the IRR is defined as the discount rate at which the investments' cash flow returns equal the cost of the investment. For the empirically common case of the negative cash flow VC investment, the resultant IRR, of course, has a negative value.
Our calculations of mean and median IRRs for the individual investments of the minority-oriented venture capital funds yielded mean IRRs of -1.7 percent and 7.9 percent, respectively, for the SBA-chartered funds and the partnership funds;
corresponding median IRR values were 6.4 percent and 2.3 percent. These unimpressive IRR descriptive statistics -perhaps suggesting low rates of return on VC investments in MBEs -are depressed, in part, by the large number of deals lacking positive paybacks (table three) . The nature of venture-capital investing is more clearly understood by delineating the generally higher returns produced on larger investments from the generally lower returns produced on smaller ones (Bates and Bradford, 2003) .
Consider a VC fund that has realized only two investments: $50,000 was invested workers on the payrolls of black businesses in 1997. These 8,682 firms not only accounted for 53.5 percent of all jobs generated by the nation's black business community; they also were expanding at roughly six times the rate of black firms generating under one million dollars in annual sales. Helping to finance this high rate of firm growth (and job creation) is the task of the minority-oriented venture-capital industry.
E. Why is the Minority-Oriented Venture-Capital Industry Moving Away from SBA Charters?
The SBA chartered VC funds analyzed in this study are solidly profitable.
Analysis of realized investments in MBEs, summarized above, revealed that the average VC investment of $390,900 yielded, at the point when it was sold, a net gain of $899,200
( In this study of 24 minority-oriented VC funds, 10 of them are SBA-chartered and 14 are partnerships having no SBA affiliations. Looking solely at minority-oriented VC funds established before 1996 -11 funds -eight were SBA-chartered and three were partnerships. Among minority-oriented VC funds chartered from 1996 to 2000, in contrast, (13 funds) two were SBA-chartered and the remaining 11 were partnerships (table four) . Obtaining a charter from the SBA was traditionally the norm for minorityoriented VC funds; now it is a rarity. What caused the change?
[ Table four about here]
Recall that the attraction luring small business investment companies to form and seek charters under the MESBIC program was the promise of cheap matching funds from the SBA. MESBICs most often tapped SBA funding by selling preferred stock to the SBA. While the preferred stock was legally a balance-sheet liability for the MESBICs, it was attractive because it required payment of only a three percent dividend to the SBA, and this dividend payment could be legally deferred during the early years of operations.
The SBA's willingness to buy preferred stock from MESBICs declined dramatically during the 1980s, and this funding source was effectively dead by 1989 (Bates, 1996) .
In its place the SBA offered small amounts of expensive debt financing to MESBICs in the 1990s, and even that source of funds was unreliable. Because expensive debt financing was inappropriate for funding equity investments in MBEs, VC-oriented MESBICs were forced to seek new sources of financial capital (Bates, 1997) .
Thus, the minority-oriented venture capital industry entered the 1990s in a crises state because its traditional source of cheap capital -SBA-subsidized funds -had dried up. Congress facilitated the industry's search for new funding sources by passing into law in 1989 the preferred stock repurchase program. This enabled MESBICs to repurchase their outstanding preferred stock (all of which was owned by the SBA) at a discount. The minority-oriented VCs had to buy back this preferred stock before they could realistically begin their search for new funding sources. As preferred stock owner, the SBA had a claim on all payouts of profits generated from venture-capital investments -present and future. Public pension funds -like other institutional investors -would not fund the venture-capital investments of MESBICs, knowing that the profits generated by those investments were subject to prior claim by the SBA. Congress passed the preferred stock repurchase program to allow the MESBICs to wipe out the SBA's claim to those profits (Bates, 1996) . years (Bates, 1996) . Stillman, in turn, delegated program responsibility first to the office of investment director, Joseph Newell, in early 1994 and then to special assistant to the office of investment Ed Cleveland later that year. The specified group of SBA analysts actually handing the repurchase applications underwent numerous changes as well.
Changing repurchase transaction conditions and terms and administering personnel created a period during which MESBICs in the program often found it impossible to infuse any type of financial capital -from pension funds or SBA or private sources -into their funds. In response, some discontinued operations. Overall, the SBA provided something of a blueprint for limiting a program's success: 1) delay implementation as long as possible; 2) continually change those responsible for program oversight and implementation; 3) constantly change the program rules (Bates, 1996) .
Implementation of the preferred stock repurchase program produced a five year funding freeze for the MESBIC portion of the minority-oriented VC industry. Relations between the MESBICs and SBA had been poisoned. In response to five years of SBA paralysis, the stronger minority business investment companies began to exit from the MESBIC program, transforming themselves into purely private small business investment companies. The weaker MESBICs often failed outright or abandoned their SBA charters.
Repurchase program veteran Donald Lawhorne, head of Dallas MESBICs, observed, "Political winds may change; fresh input may seek to reshape the MESBIC program; the SBA's long-term career bureaucrats undermine all of this" (quoted in Bates, 1998, p. 99) . MESBICs that survived the restructuring period and retained their SBA charters, finally, never did succeed in tapping the public pension funds for capital.
Restrictive SBA regulations continued to scare off potential pension fund investments (Bates, 1996) .
F. The SBA Model is Profoundly Flawed
The driving force behind rapid growth of the minority business community lies in the expanding pool of college educated, professionally trained, managerially experienced minorities seeking to start their own businesses (Greene and Owen, 2004) . Growth is most rapid at the high-end: employer firms grossing over one million dollars in annual sales revenue are particularly prominent. Serving the financing needs of these high-end MBEs, minority VC funds have expanded rapidly in size and scope (Bates and Bradford, 2003) .
The SBA-chartered venture-capital funds described in this report have clearly prospered in the 1990s (table three) . Examination of the plus and minus aspects of SBA affiliation certainly must recognize this solid financial performance. Yet we believe that strong financial gains from actual venture-capital investments were overshadowed, for the MESBICs, by SBA-imposed constraints that limited their ability to finance highgrowth minority-owned firms.
These constraints stand out clearly when SBA-affiliated minority VCs are compared to their private partnership peers. First, the average SBA fund reported a capitalization of $11.9 million versus $80.6 million for the minority-oriented VC partnership funds. Average amount invested in venture-capital deals, similarly, was much lower for the SBA-chartered funds, relative to the partnership funds (table three) Congress repealed the tax benefit in 1995, many of the 118 VC investments under consideration were made while it was in effect. Thus, a defunct tax benefit may be shaping the returns generated from financing MBE purchases of communications firms, and the funds specializing in such transactions may be impacted. We control for this in our regression analysis: VC funds are considered to be communications oriented if 40 percent or more of their investments (by dollar volume) were in that industry segment.
VC funds attempt to moderate their investments risks by alleviating information asymmetries (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) . This is done by monitoring their clients;
monitoring tools include general partners taking seats on the firms' board of directors, participating in client firms long-range planning, and, when necessary, participating in day-to-day management decision making. For each of the VC funds under consideration, data were collected on whether these types of monitoring were undertaken never, sometimes, or often. Funds scoring relatively high in such monitoring activities were identified as "highly active" with MBE portfolio firms. The highly activities funds, we hypothesize, generate higher IRRs on VC investments, other things equal (Bates and Bradford, 2003 factors constant. Being SBA chartered per se was not related to lower returns. Rather, the more specific circumstance of relying upon SBA as a funding source --and thereby being exposed to applicable restrictive rules and policies --was linked to lower returns.
[ Table five about here]
Other regression analysis findings indicate, first, that larger venture-capital investments earned higher yields (table five) . Second, investments by VC funds that were highly active in the affairs of their portfolio companies had higher IRRs, other things equal. Third, the investments of communications-oriented funds had lower IRRs than investments of diversified minority VC funds.
A minority-oriented VC fund generating above average IRRs on its small business investments can be described as 1) not accepting funding from the SBA, 2) The SBA-chartered VC funds analyzed in this study appeared to be solidly profitable (table three) . The high variance of applicable profit measures, however, compromised their reliability. When we utilized OLS regression analysis to explore one profitability measure --IRRs generated by realized venture-capital investments --we found that SBA-chartered funds were lagging. We conclude that relying upon the SBA for funding was linked to lower investment returns, other things equal.
The totality of evidence, we believe, indicates that public pension funds are an appropriate source of funding for the minority venture-capital industry and the SBA is not. While the former have the patience to serve as venture-capital funders, the SBA is not a sufficiently stable institution to serve as a capital source for minority VC funds.
Public policies that encourage pension fund investments in the minority VC industry are more promising than those seeking a role for the SBA. Specifically, SBA policies and rules that inhibit SBA-chartered funds from raising money from public pension funds need to be removed. The SBA's limited capacity to facilitate growth and development of the minority venture-capital industry, we conclude, reflects its short-term orientation toward prevailing political pressures and priorities. As Eisinger noted, priorities change; budget crises come and go; venture-capital programs wither in this environment (1993). 
